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Editorial: Crises in Europe and Challenges for Economic Education
At such dynamically changing times, where eco-
nomy is affected by multiple crises and in which
also the discipline of economics critically reflects
their limitations, it does not belong to the easiest
tasks of economic education to provide with
orientation, judgment, decision-making and action
according to economic situations, problems and
phenomena. On the one hand, the crises generates
quite considerable interest by their ubiquity,
particularly focusing on the other hand only on
fragments and dominant controversies of the
respective current situations. On the one hand, the
understanding of relationships and developments is
complex and on the other hand, considerable
uncertainty and controversy of experts create the
impression of arbitrariness. As the Crises reveal a
lot of interdependencies, also rigorous analytical
separations between economic and political
dimensions are hardly possible. While a purely
political view or a focus obscures the social
consequences also for existing economic laws, a
sole focus on the challenges of economic laws
suppresses cultural differences, economic historical
developments, lack of development of institutions
as well as individual and social affection.
Three years ago the Journal of Social Science
Education focus ‘Civic and Economic Education and
the Current Financial Crisis’ (see: Hedtke JSSE 1-
2010, Hippe JSSE 2-2010). Most of the articles in
2010 reflect the financial crisis not only as an
economic crisis, but look also at moral, social and
political intertwining as well. This current issue of
the Journal of Social Science Education was initiated
mainly by the conference of the Association of
Economics Education in Europe with the subject
‘Economic Crisis – Catastrophe or Opportunity?’ in
2012 in Germany, when mostly experts of economic
education focus on the on-going crises. At the
conference 21 lectures and workshops dealt with
economic crisis and financial education as well as
with developing, measuring and diagnosing econo-
mic, business and entrepreneurial competences.
Before we editors present an insight into some of
the contributions of the conference, which was also
offered to the journal, and passed the anonymous
review process, respectively showed good practice
in school, we would like to introduce into the
controversial perspectives and solutions upon the
economic situation in Europe. This overview should
widen up the controversially debated spectrum of
problems, causes and measures, but is not intended
to deliver final judgements. After that we will give a
small overview about surveys presenting the pers-
pectives of the youth as well as an impression of
different perspectives of European Students explo-
red by an AEEE online survey in 2012.
Since 2009 the European Union is facing a severe
economic crisis. Does the current crisis reflect the
failure of the economic player or markets? Or does it
even reflect the failure of an entire economic system
inevitably culminating in speculative bubbles,
increasing economic inequality, always accompanied
by severe crises? Or is it more of a failure of the
political institutions that relinquished its power by
the liberalization of financial markets, cancelling the
liability of financial institutions, becoming helpless
repair institutions of financial capitalism? Or is the
European crisis “only” an extension of the global
financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the rescue
of individual states, brought them to stumble
themselves? Or does it just bring the design flaws of
the European Monetary System to light? There is no
doubt about a tremendous complexity according to
the current crises.
Also there is a lot of radical criticism not only as a
topic to the left or alternative movements, but also
to business leaders and economists themselves. "The
capitalist system no longer fits into the world"
resumed Klaus Schwab (2012), founder and
Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum
2012. Economists, business ethics and social
scientists complain that the financial and euro crisis
illustrate the failure of conventional economics with
their unshakable faith in the self-healing forces of
the markets (Colander et al. 2009, Me'M 2012).
German and French economics students (e.g. Plural
Network Economics) criticized in 2012, that the
global financial crisis did not matter in their studies
and claimed a more critical use of economic
knowledge and also more plurality. George Akerlof
and Robert Shiller (2009) criticized the failure of
modern economics ignoring the animal spirits. In
Interviews Dennis Snower (2012), President of the
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, reflects, that
the economy is standing at the begin of a revolution
and Thomas Straubhaar (2012), Director of the
Hamburg Institute of International Economics calls
for an end to the imperialism of economists.
Birgit Weber is Professor for
social science with a focus
on economic education at
University of Cologne and
editor of the JSSE. Her
research interests are social
science education with a
special focus on economic
education, curriculum
development and research of
economic and social science
education. email:
birgit.weber@uni-koeln.de
Keywords:
economic crisis, European crises, concepts, views and minds about European crises, economic education
Journal of Social Science Education
Volume 12, Number 2
© JSSE 2013
ISSN 1 61 8-5293
3
US-Subprime mortgages caused European crises?
For many observers, the European crisis had its
origins in the United States. The attempt of the US
Government to encourage private home ownership
to socially disadvantaged people led to the granting
of mortgage loans at low interest rates to borrowers
with lower credit ratings (subprime loans). To relie-
ve themselves from their "bad" debts, the financial
institutions had constructed new financial products
(mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mort-
gage obligations). These uncontrolled financial
innovations are one of the central causes of the
financial crisis from 2008. As the artificially inflated
housing bubble burst and the home prices declined,
borrowers were no longer able to pay off their debts;
also for the lender it was tight. With the collapse of
the investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008, the
confidence between the banks was increasingly
shaken. They were subsequently less willing to lend
and thus a recession resulted. To mitigate a run on
banks as well as the impact on production, the
States brought up considerable resources to rescue
the banks and to stabilize economy. Thereby the
already high debt increased. In autumn 2009, when
Greece in view of oppressive debt asked for financial
assistance, the crisis hit Europe seriously. But not
only Greece, other European countries were also not
able to pay their rising government debts. As the
ratings became worse, their solvency deteriorated
further. At the same time, also U.S.A and Japan had
to contend with significant debt. The difficult
economic situation in Europe was accompanied by
considerable political tension: stepping down of
government in almost half of the countries, early
elections, changes of government and significant
social protests.
Both causes and measures are the subject of
national and international debate. Meanwhile, the
European crisis is characterized as the three vicious
spirals (Eichengreen 2012), multi-crisis (SVR 2012)
or "The euro's Three Crises" (Shambough 2012):
„The euro area faces three interlocking crises that
together challenge the viability of the currency
union. There is a banking crisis – where banks are
undercapitalized and have faced liquidity problems.
There is a sovereign debt crisis – where a number of
countries have faced rising bond yields and cha-
llenges funding themselves. Lastly, there is a growth
crisis – with both a low overall level of growth in the
euro area and an unequal distribution across coun-
tries. Crucially, these crises connect to one another.
Bailouts of banks have contributed to the sovereign
debt problems, but banks are also at risk due to
their holdings of sovereign bonds that may face
default. Weak growth contributes to the potential
insolvency of the sovereigns, but also, the austerity
inspired by the debt crisis is constraining growth.
Finally, a weakened banking sector holds back
growth while a weak economy undermines the
banks.” (Shambough 2012).
The discussion about causes and measures are
highly controversial, the following overview is
intended to facilitate the orientation.
Sovereign debt crisis
If the crisis is characterized as a sovereign debt
crisis, spendthrift states are not able to pay their
debts. Accordingly, expenses need to be decreased
and growth to be increased to enhance revenues to
pay the debt service. Changes in the European
Stability and Growth Pact and the debt brake in the
EU fiscal pact with strict caps were influenced by
these goals. But the strict budgetary discipline with
privatization and austerity could counteract growth
by leading to recession and political tension. The
doubts about austerity received new impetus, as
errors in the study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
were discovered, so that politicians could not rely
any more to a scientifically proved exact limit for
negative growth effects by a special rate of debt.
Furthermore Neo-Keynesians (e.g. Blanchard / Leigh
2013) offer results showing the underestimation of
negative growth effects by government cutbacks. In
order to increase tax revenue, also tax evasions
must be combated, which needs confidence of tax
payers in the performance of their political
institutions. Current public debt could also be
reduced by a haircut of debt, which could take
frivolous creditors in liability and would work as an
incentive against frivolous lending. Hans-Werner
Sinn (2010, 2013) warns before moral hazard,
calling for an appropriate liability for borrowers and
lenders. He is concerned that those reckless
borrowers may proceed as before. Against this, for
the German economist Peter Bofinger (2012) such
debt cuts raise rates by decreasing confidence. The
moral hazard concern is also associated with
measures to reduce debt by jointly guaranteed euro
bonds. To avoid acute threat of insolvency or
liquidity problems, emergency loans and guarantees
like a euro bailout or a European Stability
Mechanism, were designed with conditions to
reduce debt causes. There is still doubt, if these
measures oppose against the bailout-clause, which
prohibits mutual liability. The situation is similar to
the highly controversial loans and the purchase of
government bonds by the ECB, respectively the
loans from the strong to the weak countries’
National banks. Against the moral hazard argument
the Belgian Economist and LSE Professor in
European Political Economy Paul de Grauwe (2011)
retorts, that the ECB has no alternative being the
lender of last resort, because the “self-fulfilling
nature of expectations creates a coordination
failure” (p. 3) and has to “impose limits on risk
taking by banks” (p. 9). Looking at the crisis only as
a sovereign debt crisis leads to radical measures to
cut the debt service, but will create problematic
side-effects. Also the problem is focused only on the
states living above their means, but did not look at
the initiating causes of the debt or coordination
failures.
Bank crisis
If the crisis is seen as a bank respectively
financial crisis, the sovereign debt is not the final
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cause, it is born by the rescue of banks by the states.
The criticism directs to the non-performing loans at
risk of default and the insufficient capital base of the
banks, so that there are considerable risks of infe-
ction to any shocks. Also, closely locked to the
banks, the financial markets are criticized for being
too optimistic at the beginning of the Eurozone and
later too pessimistic, so the financial market system
should also bear the blame for the crisis by following
animal spirits (Akerlof/Shiller 2009). According to
such an explanation the problem is not to save coun-
tries, who act uneconomically, but to protect them
against the panic attacks of the markets. This argu-
ment forces directly to a common liability currency
area. Appropriate measures are aimed at a European
financial supervision, with sufficient information,
intervention, restructuring rights and instruments,
that sets boundaries to systemically important banks
("too big to fail") and prevent socializing risks and
spreading macroeconomic problems by coordinated
collective acts, according to the German Council of
Economic Experts (SVR 2012: 6). While politicians
want to avoid runs on banks with a European deposit
guarantee, economists consider this to be an
insurance policy after the damaging event creating a
significant disincentive for moral hazard by a
transfer mechanism, instead, a European coordinated
solutions for restructuring national banks should be
installed (SVR 2012: 27f). The argument of a bank
crisis is strongly intertwined with the development of
the Euro and the currency union.
Euro crisis
If the crisis is interpreted as a euro crisis, the
cause is seen on the one side in the ability of the
deficit countries to borrow more than their national
situation would allow without the Euro, on the other
hand their current competitiveness do not match
with the external value of the Euro, but being a
member of the currency union they have no chance
to protect themselves through the exchange rate
mechanism. If there are countries that do not fit in
the Currency Union the way out is to be seen in a
Euro-Exit or in a split up currency Union. This could
limit the liability of the European Union and reduce
future inflation risk. Such a position seems to be
independent of the political spectrum, but it depends
on different prognoses: While some do not want to
joint liability (Sinn/Sell 2012, Sinn 2013), others fear
a threat to democracy facing the consequences of
the high adjustment costs in the countries concerned
(Flassbeck 2013, Streeck 2013) and finally, if the
agenda of problems seem to be tremendous, there
are also warnings like Nouriel Roubini (2012): “So, if
a breaking is unavoidable, delaying it implies much
higher costs”. If a euro collapse or exclusion of
states would happen, the affected states would be
confronted with capital flight and a run on banks.
This would also bring painful consequences,
economic slumps and deflation with it. Also domino
effects are foreseen as well as global recession.
Splitting up or exclusions would also work like a
haircut of debt, where economically stronger
losses of claims and growth (SVR 2012: 8f). Instead
splitting the European Union or give chance to exit,
especially advocates of European integration call for
completion from the currency union to the political
union. But at least a minimum of institutions to
overcome the crisis and as a solid base for the future
the Euro seem to be needed, according to the
experts of the INET Council on the Euro Crisis (INET
2012).
System crisis
Finally, the crisis is also interpreted as a crisis of
the system (eg EuroMemo 2012, Streeck 2013,
Flassbeck 2013). This perspective results from
macroeconomic imbalances between northern and
southern countries on the one side and substantial
wealth inequality on the other side. Some criticism,
e.g. Johnson 2009, even goes so far as accusing
politicians and the financial oligarchy of a “silent
coup”. Accordingly, the measures focus on redistri-
bution of ownership to the labour income, thus an
increase in aggregate demand is hoped that affect
real economic investment, which removes excess
liquidity in financial markets. From such a pers-
pective, austerity with wages and welfare cuts,
reduction of workers’ rights and the privatization of
debt settlement are counterproductive and serve to
increase the investment income. The
EuroMemorandum Group (2012) calls for solidarity
instead of austerity as well as for a democratic,
social and ecological Europe, not least through redis-
tribution of wealth. The surplus countries should
reduce their trade surpluses through wage increases
and the increase of aggregate demand, so that the
imbalances in Europe are reduced. Especially
households with high wealth and income should be
used for property taxes and forced loans, while
stricter rules for financial markets improve their
socially useful function. However, associated with
such redistribution measures, the concern is to set
disincentives for performance, and to end up casual
tax evasion.
Complexity of the crises
Shambough (2012: 34) resumes: “Thus, many of
the main policies pursued thus far aid with
symptoms of one crisis, but often only temporarily or
at the expense of another crisis. Austerity can cut
deficits, but at the expense of growth. Locally funded
bank bailouts can aid bank solvency, but at the
expense of sovereign solvency. Increased bank
capital requirements can calm bank solvency fears,
but at the expense of lending and growth. EFSF
bailouts have staved off disorderly defaults, but have
done little to solve the fundamental issues. Finally,
the LTRO can aid bank liquidity problems, but if used
to buy sovereign debt (and help sovereign liquidity)
the cost is further strengthening the bank sovereign
connection. Structural growth policies are likely part
of a medium run solution, but it seems overly
optimistic to expect them to provide near term help.”
As the crises are mutually dependent, Eichengreen
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(2012) speaks about the three “vicious spirals”, he
sees between public debt and the banks, fiscal
consolidation and growth, unemployment and
political reactions. Also the German Council of
economic experts argues that mutually reinforcing
multiple crises caused a severe systemic crisis of
confidence (SVR 2012, 11). While some want to
restore the confidence of the markets through
consistent savings and the avoidance of moral
hazard through debt extension, others criticize, that
this policy of austerity raises social imbalance,
conjures up political crises and lastly seems to be a
threat for democracy. This debate, creating different
solutions also between Anglo-America and Europe
also depends on completely different economic
structures and cultures (eg. Uwe Jean Heuser 2012).
So in the Anglo-American countries the financial
sector plays a greater role, whereas in Germany
medium-sized business structure dominates. In the
Anglo-American regions also the rather young
population seems to be more risky, whereas
Germany faces a more risk-prone, aging population.
Currently, the European south faces growing
poverty and rising unemployment, as dramatic
consequences of the crisis accompanied by growing
protests especially from a youth without a future.
During the end of 2012 almost one in four young
people was unemployed in Europe, in Spain and
Greece it was even more than a half (Hutengs /
Stadtmann 2012, 2013). Thus, Wolfgang Franz
(2012), chairman of the German Council of Economic
Experts (SVR) with a focus on the labour market sees
in this youth unemployment the most serious
problem, because the ‘youth unemployment would be
no wound healing quickly, it remains as an ugly scar
for the entire life with lower chances for jobs and
incomes’. According to statistical studies, the need to
differ between 15-19 and 20-24 year old youth as
well as a comparison between the unemployment of
the 20-24 year old with overall unemployment and
percentage of total unemployment, to Mikkel
Barslund and Daniel Gros (2013) the problem is
overestimated. Instead of enhancing additional
funding to subsidize no sustainable work the EU
should encourage labour mobility. The existence of
youth unemployment is disputed as well as the
measures. What can the EU, what can the countries
themselves do? Should the labour market be more
flexible to release entrepreneurial forces and
restrictions on employment? Should mobility be
promoted, even if it exacerbates European imba-
lances? Should the austerity policy in favour of
growth, operate more hesitantly?
Presence of the crisis in the European minds
To economic education especially the perspectives
of the Youth are of a special interest. It is not
astonishing that they present different answers – due
to the focus of different causes and instruments in
the interviews.
• Thus, the German Association for Consumer
Research (GfK 2012) interviewed 758 Germans
aged 14-24 with a representative opinion survey
commissioned by the Banking Association. Here,
the multi-dimensionality of the crisis is unnoticed
asking directly about the "sovereign debt and eu-
ro crisis" … "triggered by the high debt of some
European countries ...." Given the 94% of young
people are affirmative showing their strong pre-
sence, with approximately half of indicating to
talk about it often, but only 15% seem to be con-
cerned by themselves. Although a large proporti-
on of young people are likely to have experienced
the old currency barely conscious, more than half
can imagine a future without the euro, while only
about two-fifths vote for the rescue of states that
are in distress due to high debt.
• In June 2012 Infratest dimap asked 1000 Ger-
mans older than 17 years about the Crisis. 50%
feel the Euro being disadvantageous. 85% expect,
that the worst of the crisis is yet to come, while
71% want to be asked before competences are
transferred to the European level, 55% support
national budgetary policies and only 39% agree
for a shift, 45% do not want common liability for
the debt, 44% decide for clear rules on joint liabi-
lity and for only 10 % a common liability belongs
to a common currency.
• In July 2012, TNS Emnid 1503 surveyed over
1503 Austrians and Germans older than 13 year
old about the crisis. They discovered that 81 % of
the participants support a new economic order,
that forces protection of environment, careful de-
aling with resources and social balance. Less than
a third of Germans and less than a quarter of
Austrians believed in the self-healing powers of
markets. In terms of strategies for overcoming
the crisis, the respondents split into two camps:
those who favour more growth and those who
saw clear austerity as a solution.
• In face-to-face-interviews with 26.593 Euro-
peans aged 15 and over TNS opinion (2012) made
a Eurobarometer survey about the crisis and the
economic governance in Europe on behalf of the
European Parliament. Whereas 25% agreed to sti-
mulate the economy, 23 % supported decreasing
public spending. There seem to be a clear favour
of collective coordinated action by 55 %, while
38 % are in favour of individual measures. 80 % re-
gard help by conditions and 72 % call for penal-
ties against breaking rules.
Looking to the very different results of the polls
on behalf of different actors it seems to be obvious,
that the different explanations, the participants were
asked about the causes, produce contrary opinions
especially between national sovereignty and EU
coordination, but it does not show the different
views of the young people in the different European
states.
Exploring the views of European students on the
economic crisis
As a European project the Association of Econo-
mics Education in Europe also wanted to
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discover the views of European students about the
economic crisis. Far from being a representative
study 680 students participated in this survey,
coming from Italy (30%), Austria (23%), Germany
(20%) and Ireland (12%), France and United Kingdom
(both 6%), 43% are Male and 57% Female, 75% are
born between 1993 and 1995. 60% attended
economics courses – most of them being Italians –
34% attended social science including economics,
with the majority coming from Germany. The
preliminary findings give an impressive insight to the
different types of crisis according to blamed causes
as well as claimed measures to solve the crisis.
• Who or what is responsible for the crisis? The
interviewees were asked: “To what extent did you
agree that the following have contributed to
causing the current economic crisis” (Question 12)
and, “Do you believe that the causes of the crisis
originate mainly in your country, in other
countries, in the rest of Europe, in the rest of the
world outside Europe?” (Question 13-16): Most of
the participants – independent of country, sex and
course – blamed the banks for high risk lending
and borrowing. Looking at the differences within
the countries, most of the participating Italians
(mostly students in economic courses) blamed the
action of their own government, but also the tax
evasion and the growing gap between rich and
poor. Even more, the participating Germans
(mostly students in social science courses) blamed
the economic gap between EU-countries. Most of
the Austrian, German and male youths found the
origins of the crises in other countries, where the
level of those who also blamed their own country
reached the highest score in Italy.
• What are possible solutions for the crisis? The
participants were asked: “In order to solve the
crisis in your country/the European Union it is
necessary to …” (Question 17, 18): Nearly two
thirds of the participating students called for
economic growth, more than half of them asked
regulations of financial markets and demanded
European inspectors for that context. There are
great differences between European countries and
subjects belonging to the European Integration:
Whereas Italians and students in economic courses
prefer EU-Inspectors, the participating Germans
and students enrolled to social science go for a
common European Ministry of Economic Affairs.
According to their national concerns, there were
more Italians asking for help to enable weak
countries paying off their debts respectively trans-
ferring funds. Only a quarter of the participants
agreed to exclude weak countries from the Euro-
zone or to reduce social welfare in weak countries.
• What do the European students associate with
the crisis? They were asked: “Write some words
and phrases that they associate with «the
Economic Crisis» that has been domination the
news.” (Question 10). The directly affected
students in Italy and Ireland are concerned about
broadening of the hassle, unemployment, low
investment rates, recession, depression,
inflation,poverty and suicide. To the Germans the
loss of the value of their currency, raising debts,
instability, Eurozone-exit, dissatisfaction, but also
some commitment with the countries in the south
have been the most mentioned associations.
Crises - a golden opportunity for economic
education?
It seems a bit sarcastic, to call the crises a golden
opportunity for economic education. Many articles in
this issue talk about the crisis as an “ideal”
(MITTELSTAEDT, etc.) or "golden” (LÖFSTRÖM / VAN
DEN BERG) teaching moment, which promotes even
without formal instruction the understanding of
complex economic concepts (PLIAKIS et al). Some
authors require different social science concepts to
explain and deal with the crisis (MITTELSTÄDT et al),
but also the ability to promote the understanding of
the political and economic contexts (LÖFSTRÖM /
VAN DEN BERG) in order to control the political and
economic authorities as well (PLIAKIS et al). As the
development of such an understanding should be
considered, PLIAKIS et al test Greek students with the
test of economic literature (TEL), JEZIORKI et al
illustrate the understanding of uncertainty and risk in
time of crisis of Italian and French adolescents and
SPEER/SEEBER examine the existing understanding of
young Germans about credits and loans. Looking at
the understanding of teachers and students the
studies from Finland of LÖFSTRÖM / VAN DEN BERG
clarified the understanding of economic and political
contexts within the crises, while ASANO ET AL
express their concern about the quality of economic
competences by Japanese teachers of civics tested
with the TEL. The last two contributions do not deal
with the crises. VARUM et al gives a review of the
focus of research in economic education in recent
decades. As an example of good practice (without
peer review) WEYLAND/REHM show with a case study,
that economic education could be implemented as
well in a subject of social science. The following
should give a little insight in the contributions.
To EWALD MITTELSTÄDT, CLAUDIA WIEPCKE and
ROMAN LUTZ the Financial Crisis seems to be an
‘ideal teaching moment’, as their contribution
promise to foster socio-economic learning. The
authors give an overview about the causes of the
financial crisis and discuss solutions without
neglecting social and ecological constraints.
Regarding the traditional economic, political and
sociologic concepts of human activity the authors
criticize their shortcomings and propose a ‘deuteron’
learning model for learning in and from the crises.
Based on the categorical approach of economic
education it should be combined with ethics, history,
civics and also natural science.
The crisis does not only seem to be an ideal
teaching moment at school, as IRAKLIS PLIAKIS,
DESPOINA BOUSIOU-MAKRIDOU and STAVROS
TSOPOGLOU discover in an exploratory research in
Greece. The everyday presence of the economic crisis
increased the students’ performance of some
complex concepts of economics in the TEL, which
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seem to be considerably high compared with results
in the US, although the mean score is lower. Most
astonishing is the increase in complex concepts,
which were not thoroughly taught, like budget
deficit, unemployment or per capita income. Asked
about the sources of their economic information the
students mentioned besides the first year at senior
high school their family, internet, television and
friends as important source of data. The authors
conclude, that it should be necessary, to identify
closer those experiential-empirical knowledge, to
meet the willingness of participating and get a
deeper understanding of the social phenomena –
referring to the basic aim of school: creating
democratic citizens, who are able to control the
political and economic authorities.
A special attendance to the relationship between
school knowledge and social knowledge was
focused by AGNIESZKA JEZIORKI, ALAIN LEGARDEZ
and DORIS VALENTE. Since 2000 they analysed the
representations of Italian and French students about
Uncertainty and Risk. Nowadays looking at those
representations in the times of crisis they want to
identify constants and changes by speculating on
causes and effects. They base their research on the
one side on the structural approach of social
representation in order to find the elements of the
core concepts of uncertainty and on the other side
upon socially acute questions in order to transform
it in social knowledge and civic behaviour. They
show that 2009 the students primarily evoke crisis,
unemployment, inflation and the stock market as
well in Italy as in France, whereas risk is connected
to investment, business and financial markets. Due
to their study the participants regard the big actors
bearing risk and the small ones, but also the
governments having to deal with uncertainty. With
regard to the concept of uncertainty, they note a
significantly higher presence of the socio-political
context of the time and between countries in the
results of 2009. The authors hypothesize that the
concerns of the young Italians are likely to be
radicalized by a deepening of the crisis. Discussing
the existence of social representation, effects or
orthodox contexts, the existence of concurrent
knowledge, they finally draw conclusions to develop
teaching strategies to identify obstacles and
support.
Not facing national debt but taking a loan is the
subject of SANDRA SPEER and GÜNTHER SEEBER, who
want to give a systematic picture of students’
reasoning about private credit with a phenomeno-
graphic access in order to understand the financial
understanding of secondary school students and
teacher trainees. Before designing their own study
they give us an insight into the findings of financial
literacy research, looking at financial knowledge and
counting with interest and inflation rates as well as
behavioural Economics and Economic Psychology,
discovering the factors influencing the bounded
rationality. In 13 focus groups with 89 persons
discussing carefully structured different cases of
loan taking, which could be used as case studies,
the authors show moral attitudes, needs, credit
terms and calculation as part of the hierarchy of
judgments on the one side, liquidity more than risk,
budget more than needs, while misunderstandings
develop by mixing up terms, neglecting incomes,
costs or saving. Besides given a basis for application
of variation theory the authors recommend their
case studies and results for teaching economic
education to become aware of the level of reasoning
and attitudes influencing behaviour and the own
moral pre-concepts, exaggerating the picture of total
credit costs.
Like other authors in this issue JAN LÖFSTRÖM
and MARKO VAN DEN BERG regard the economic
crisis as “A golden opportunity for economic
education”, regarding the growing interest of the
youth in discussing economics. On the one side they
present a close insight into the Finnish subject of
social studies. This subject discusses the political
system and economy in two courses, currently
mostly taught by teachers of history. On the other
side they design a thick picture about the treatment
of the financial crisis in economic education as a
part of social studies by a detailed analysis of
textbooks and examination results. Whereas a wide
national core curriculum gives a lot of flexibility,
their analysis led them to discover a prudent and
neutral view on the financial crisis in textbooks,
whereas in economic education the dominance of a
neoclassical approach exists, while the authors miss
the intertwining between politics and the economy.
Analysing the results of students’ examination they
regard lacks using appropriate economic
terminology with conceptual errors, while the
students dominantly try to describe narratives of
economic events, pushed by structural forces. The
authors found lacks regarding the inner logic on the
one side and conceiving economy as a field with
human actors on the other side. Far from blaming
the Finnish students, who reached high scores in
international comparison tests, the analysis contains
the different conditions leading to these results and
finishes with the appeal, to reflect much more
economy as a part of society, which affords the
combining from historical, sociological and political
analysis with economic education as well.
Close to the missing economic background of
Finnish teachers TADAYOSHI ASANO, MICHIO
YAMAOKA and SHINTARO ABE are concerned about
the quality of economic competences of the teachers
of civics in Japan, who have to teach economic
literacy, but seldom studied economics themselves.
So they investigate the attitudes and thoughts about
economics and economy of the teachers. In their
article they show clearly the characteristics of
economics teachers in Japanese high schools by
their profile, their present, post and school
characteristics, their learning experience about
economic issues, in order to clarify one important
factor why many high school students lack for
economic literacy in Japan. So they are able to “form
a true image of those teachers”, showing that a few
of them never studied economics and many of them
display difficulties teaching economics. As attitudes
the authors discover an egalitarian view, criticism
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against moneymaking, mistrust against market
mechanism and a high acceptance of government’s
intervention to correct results of market transaction.
Whereas also the students dislike Civics most of all
subject areas, the authors conclude an extreme
scope for improvements in textbooks as well as in
teacher competences.
The adventure to throw light upon the growing
outcome of economic education research had been
undertaken by CELESTE VARUM, ABIGAIL FERREIRA
and ANA BREDA. The authors review the directions
that research about economics education have
followed in the last decades, in order to systematize
and organize the literature. The results should bring
the value to a wider public and indicate the fields for
future research. Analysing the Science Citation Index
and the Social Sciences Citation Index as well as four
specialised journals (including this one) they found
contributions to different topics economics edu-
cation research are addressed to: issues and ques-
tions, techniques useful for research, ideological
message, level of economic literacy, contents and
structure of economics education in different
countries, methods and materials, outcomes from
instruction, efficiency of courses, students attitudes
and values, students understanding, teacher effects,
learning outcomes and performance depending on
personal and sociocultural characteristics. Besides
the value of showing the “fathers and mothers” of
that typical kind of research in the field of
economics education and the growth of results, the
authors point out the windows of opportunities for
future research. In their opinion the adequate time
of beginning economic education, teaching methods
and the use of economics education to individuals’
attitudes and competitiveness are those issues.
In their case study MICHAEL WEYLAND and
MARCO REHM attract attention to the controversy,
whether economic education should be anchored on
own or as an integrated subject like social science.
Given an example of a German grammar school,
where economic education seldom is placed as a
lone subject, the authors show by presentation of
examples how economic education can be placed in
a social science subject with success, like some
prices in competition show. Even if the examples
seem to be well known for typical economic
education the authors demonstrate that a social
science subject must not occur problems, but could
allow additional benefit: Problem and action
oriented, research based learning could foster multi-
dimensional economic learning without neglecting
economic theory.
I would like to thank
• the authors for interesting contributions and
patience,
• the reviewers for critical and helpful
comments,
• Simon Niklas Hellmich, the JSSE’s editorial
assistant, for help, patience and competence,
• Stefan Karduck and Mark William Downes for
critical and helpful remarks to the editorial,
• Hans Jürgen Schlösser as my co-editor and
chairman of AEEE for thorough reading and
checking the papers a several times and a lot of
valuable remarks and last but not least,
• the Association of Economics Education in
Europe (AEEE) for financial support to this
edition.
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